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Abstract
This study seeks to contribute to the limited knowledge on the health insurance market in Co-
lombia. Using a database constructed for this purpose, we describe the structure of the health 
insurance market in Colombia, specifically its two types of insurance, for 33 market areas during 
the period 2007-2011. Taking as a central concern the role of insurance as a guarantee of access 
to health services, this study aims to analyze the impact of health insurers’ market power on in-
surance coverage. The principal result verifies the existence of concentrated markets, and insur-
ers have power in those markets in terms of their influence on the level of insurance coverage. 
This leads to concentrated market structures and thus the exercise of market power by insurers, 
which constitute potential constraints in access to health services.
Keywords: market concentration, market power on access, health insurance, health system, insurance coverage, 
Colombia.
JEL Classification: D43
1. IntroductIon 
Markets in health care are characterized by multiple imperfections, largely resulting from uncer-
tainty and information asymmetries between buyers and sellers; these imperfections are inherent 
in the nature of health and medical care (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968; Gaynor & Vogt, 2000). As a 
result, social welfare issues must be decided in a second-best context, which has led policy mak-
ers to favor strong state intervention through regulation. However, information on health insur-
ance markets operation remains scarce, and public policies have been developed based more 
on assumptions regarding how these markets are changing and how they respond to regulation 
(Dafny et al., 2011; Gaynor & Vogt, 2000).
The main literature in this field concerns the insurance market in the United States, for which 
empirical evidence, in the form of certain databases and statistical information, has only recently 
become available. In the case of Latin America, such studies are almost nonexistent due to the 
absence of reliable information, and ongoing efforts to reform health systems in recent years, 
such as Colombia.
The recent debate on social security reform and hence health insurance systems (Colombia 1993, 
2007, 2011, United States 2009-2010; China 2003) has primarily focused on the consequences of 
the non-competitive nature of the health insurance industry. Reviews generally come from dif-
ferent medical and hospital associations, in the case of the United States, and user associations 
and the Comptroller General of the Republic in Colombia, who argue that most metropolitan 
▪
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areas are dominated by a few large insurance firms. This may result in non-competitive markets 
where health insurers exercise market power in their respective product markets (Bates et al., 
2010). Despite the public importance of this issue, relatively few empirical studies have exam-
ined the relationship between concentration in health insurance markets and the exploitation of 
market power.
This study seeks to contribute to the limited knowledge on the health insurance market in Co-
lombia. Using a database constructed for this purpose, we describe the structure of the health 
insurance market in Colombia, specifically its two types of insurance, for 33 market areas during 
the period 2007-2011. Taking as a central concern the role of insurance as a guarantee of access 
to health services, this study aims to analyze the impact of health insurers’ market power on 
insurance coverage in Colombia. Following Bates et al. (2010), who diverge from the trend in 
the recent literature about market power of health insurers. We do not focus on changes in the 
value of the premium but on insurance coverage, in order to analyze the impact of health insur-
ers’ market power on the percentage of insured individuals in different areas of the Colombian 
market.
The principal result verifies the existence of concentrated markets, and insurers have power in 
those markets in terms of their influence on the level of insurance coverage. This leads to con-
centrated market structures and thus the exercise of market power by insurers, which constitute 
potential constraints in access to health services.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the health insurance 
market in Colombia; Section 3 presents the literature review; Section 4 discusses the research 
methodology and data; Section 5 presents the results of the analysis; and Section 6 presents the 
conclusions and limitations of the study.
2. the Insurance market In colombIa
The Social Security System in Health -SGSSS- in Colombia aims to provide all individuals, 
regardless of their financial means, with access to a package of basic services. Following this 
objective, the system is divided into two insurance regimes: a Contributory Regime (CR), which 
guarantees access to a compulsory health plan to higher- and middle-income individuals (taxpay-
ers under this regime include labor contract workers, public servants earning over a minimum 
monthly salary, € 318 in 2011, and their beneficiaries: wife (husband), children under 18, children 
with disabilities, and students under 25 years old). The second is the Subsidized Regime (SR), 
which guarantees its members access to a subsidized health plan and focuses on the poor.
The contributory scheme is financed through mandatory contributions applied to members, 
corresponding to 12.5% of salary. The employer is responsible for 8.5%, and the employee is 
responsible for 4%. The contribution is collected by insurance companies, health promoting 
entities (EPS), which are freely selected by the member. The EPS deducts from each contribu-
tion the value of the legally stipulated premium, called the capitation payment unit (UPC), and 
transfers the difference to a public fund called the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund (Fosyga). The 
UPC is the premium that the social security system provides to the EPS for each member in 
exchange for the mandatory package of health services (POS). A percentage of the contribution, 
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called a solidarity point, is transferred to regional entities to fund membership in the subsidized 
regime.
The right to membership in the subsidized regime is determined according to the classification 
given by the Beneficiary Identification System (Sisben). This system classifies the population 
into six levels, one of which represents lower socioeconomic status. The population classified in 
Sisben levels I and II are eligible for the subsidized regime. The subsidized insurance system is 
managed by the Subsidized Regime Administrators (ARS or EPSS). Members can choose their 
insurance company, and the insurers receive a premium for each insured individual (UPC-subsi-
dized), corresponding to the estimated value of the services in the package provided by the state 
under this regime. It is the responsibility of each EPSS to establish agreements with public and 
private hospitals (IPS), as well as professionals who provide health services to beneficiaries, to 
support the subsidized health plan (POSS).
The two regimes (agents) created to manage insurance provision are service companies, which 
can be public, private or mixed, with the basic function of “organizing and guaranteeing, directly 
or indirectly, the provision of a mandatory health plan to enrollees” (Law 100, art. 177). Thus, 
the two fundamental variables are regulated by the state: the mandatory health plan (POS), an 
homogeneous single health plan required to provide the EPS and EPSS to its members and 
develops the list of services, medicines and procedures covered, and the unit of payment per 
capita (UPC), which is the price, or premium, that these entities receive to cover the value of 
POS, including administrative costs. An important difference between these two regimes is that 
while demand for coverage in the contributory regime, through the EPS, arises because each 
individual able to pay freely choose an EPS, in the subsidized regime, the demand captured by 
the EPSS is mediated by a state agent (municipality or health department) that is responsible for 
signing contracts to enroll poor individuals in an entity.
The rules governing the entry and operation of insurers can be classified, following Arango 
et al. (2002), according to their content and purpose: technical standards, financial standards, 
and relationships with users. The first rules are barriers related to the size of the insurer and its 
composition: EPS were required to have at least 20,000 affiliates in the first year and 50,000 in 
the second. For EPSS, no limitations were established regarding the composition of its enrolled 
population in terms of age group or gender. At the beginning EPSS was initially authorized to 
operate with 5,000 members and 50,000 beginning in the third year; then, in 2001, EPSS was 
required to certify it ruled that should certify 200,000 members or 50,000, with some limitations 
on administrative expenses. There are also regulations on capital, solvency margin and the defi-
nition of the legal reserve that insurers are required to maintain: the mandatory capital amount 
for each EPS is 10,000 times the legal monthly minimum wage (SMLV).
The use of exclusions and pre-existing conditions is prohibited under both regimes. With respect 
to the use of services, members of the contributory scheme must be affiliated with the plan for a 
minimum of 18 months to receive medical services considered high cost, while no such restric-
tions exist under the subsidized regime. Law 100 also establishes copayments to regulate the use 
of services. Under the Act, multiple copayments cannot be applied to a service simultaneously, 
and should take the member’s income into account. 
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Finally, the provision of health services is the responsibility of the so-called Health Provider 
Institutions (IPS), which can be public or private organizations that provide health services. 
After the reform, the public hospitals began to compete with the private sector in the provision 
of services. Thus to protect the former, EPSS was required to meet at least 60% of its demand 
with public hospitals. Under the CR, Law 100 allows an EPS to provide services directly or con-
tract with provider institutions (IPS), but this is not allowed under the SR. Additionally, an EPS 
is allowed to create its own IPS, engage in takeovers, mergers and other vertical relationships 
between insurers and health service providers. In 2007, due to concerns over the trend toward 
high levels of vertical integration, Act 1122 introduced a limit to integration mandating that an 
EPS cannot use its own IPS for any more than 30% of health expenditures.
Vasquez and Gómez (2004), in a quantitative and qualitative study for the insurance market in 
Colombia, identified that the profile of members within each EPS may have similar character-
istics in terms of: type of work, type of membership, age, gender, high-cost diseases and geo-
graphic location, which may be due to a self-selection problem; or the establishment of market 
niches by insurance companies. Following the second argument, one of the most recent studies 
on the insurance market in Colombia, conducted by the Superintendence of Industry and Com-
merce, emphasizes the EPSs’ differential participation in different segments of the population 
and explains that these differences may be a signal of risk selection practices by some insurers 
(Superintendence of Industry and Commerce, 2012). 
3. lIterature revIew
When analyzing competition in health care markets and specifically among insurers, researchers 
and regulators recognize that insurers compete for customers within local geographic markets. 
The most recent trend in these studies has been to investigate how concentrated insurers are, the 
extent to which this concentration is desirable, and to measure the degree to which such concen-
tration results in market power.
Several studies published in the health economics or health services literature examine the re-
lationship between the structure of the insurance industry and an outcome variable, which is 
usually the price (or premium). A review by Scanlon et al. (2006) found 35 studies in the period 
1994-2004 investigating the impact of competition among health insurers on health care out-
comes. Of these, seven consider some measure of the premium as the outcome of interest. Most 
find a negative association between competition and the premium. However, these studies face 
significant problems related to the data quality, and none of them address the potential endog-
eneity of the measure of competition employed.
Gaynor and Town (2011) recognize a change in this trend and note that the last ten years have 
witnessed a growing use of methods that originate in industrial organization studies. It has only 
recently become possible to find papers that address the issue of competition among insurance 
firms, although these primarily address the U.S. market (Dranove et al., 2003, Town & Liu, 2003; 
Maestas et al., 2009; Lustig, 2010 and Starc, 2010) and specifically insurance markets in Switzer-
land and the Netherlands in Frank & Lamiraud (2009) and Bolhaar et al. (2010), respectively.
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The three most recent and outstanding works in this area are Dafny (2008), Dafny (2010) and 
Dafny et al. (2011b). Dafny (2008), explores the competitive behavior in local geographic mar-
kets in the United States, for the period 1998-2005. The author provides evidence of direct price 
discrimination by more profitable firms, suggesting that health insurers possess and exercise 
market power in at least one market.
Dafny (2010), uses a model of negotiation between insurers and employers. Specifically, the pa-
per investigates whether firms with high profits pay higher insurance premiums, controlling for 
differences in selected plans, working populations and market conditions. The author finds that 
firms with positive profit shocks face large premium increases, even for the same health plan. 
This increase is higher in markets with fewer insurers (particularly six or fewer).
In Dafny et al. (2011b), follow the approach of the Structure Conduct Performance paradigm 
using the same data set as Dafny (2008). In this case, they examine how the rate of insurance 
premium growth is affected by the degree of concentration in the insurance market, as measured 
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index (HHI). Specifically, they analyze the 1999 
merger of the insurers Aetna and Prudential Health Care. The authors exploit the differential 
impact of the merger in different local markets to estimate the causal effect of this concentra-
tion on market-level premiums. They find that the merger led to a nearly two percentage point 
increase in premiums during the study period.
The only works that regard the premium-concentration relationship differently, and are of par-
ticular interest to this research, are those of Bates et al. (2010) and Pauly et al. (2002). The first 
employs panel data from 50 states and the District of Columbia in the United States for the 
period 2001-2007 and examines how market concentration in health insurance at the state level 
influences the percentage of population with individually purchased private health insurance 
or employer-sponsored coverage. The results suggest that health insurers possess and exercise 
market power. Specifically, the results indicate that an increase in the HHI reduces membership 
in the individually purchased insurance segment.
Pauly et al. (2002) studied the relationship between the levels of competition in the insurance 
market in the United States between 1994 and 1997, and the profitability enjoyed by the insur-
ance companies. The authors seek to verify that insurers with lower profitability are in more 
competitive markets and thereby determine whether competition drives down unusually high 
profits over time. They found that the profits were significantly lower on average in 1994 in more 
competitive markets, measured by using the number of HMOs or HHI. Moreover, those markets 
with higher returns were not able to maintain their relative position in 1997.
4. methodology and data
4.1 Sample and data sources
The data used in this analysis consist of 165 observations from a five-year panel constructed using 
different sources (National Department of Statistics, DANE, Ministry of Social Protection and 
Solidarity and Guarantee Fund, Fosyga). Each observation represents a geographical area (Depart-
ment), and hence the unit of analysis will be 33 geographical market areas over five years.
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The data on the socio-demographic characteristics of the 33 market areas used in the regression 
include the period 2007-2011, and the variables are as follows:
A proxy for per-capita income: regional per capita GDP (measured in 2007 dollars).
Total population: total population by market area.
Children: proportion of children in a market area, calculated as those under five years of 
age.
Elderly: the population over 55 years, age range taken from the national policy on aging and 
old age, 2007-2009, from the Ministry of Social Protection.
Higher education coverage: proportion of the population having completed higher educa-
tion.
The data on the insurance market include the enrollment information and number of insurers in 
the contributory regime (CR) and the subsidized regime (SR) for the 33 market areas used in the 
regression during 2007-2011. The coverage ratio was estimated using as reference the potential 
population of each regime. Thus, to calculate the potential of SR, I used the population, classi-
fied as SISBEN 1 and 2, plus the indigenous population, less the population in the SISBEN 1 
and 2 covered with CR. And the potential population for the contributory regime was calculated 
as the difference between the total population and the potential of the subsidized regime. The 
variables are:
Affiliated with the CR: total active population in the contributory regime, including contrib-
utors and beneficiaries. Information available through the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund 
(Fosyga), Badua membership records published in December of each year. This variable is 
used to determine the coverage percentage of the contributory regime in each market area, 
as a proportion of the population enrolled in the CR compared to the potential population 
of the market area for each year.
Affiliated with the SR: total active population in the subsidized regime, including the head of 
household and his (her) beneficiaries. Information available through Fosyga, Source Badua 
records published in December of each year. This variable is used to determine the percent-
age of subsidized coverage, as the proportion of the population enrolled in the subsidized 
regime compared to the potential population of the market area.
Number of EPS: total insurers (in CR and SR).
4.2 Empirical model
The restriction of product availability forms the basis of the reduced form model of the health 
insurance product (Q) that will address the objective of this work. Specifically, the small number 
of firms is captured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), under the assumption of barri-
ers to entry, and X represents various conditions of market supply and demand.








ܳ௝௧
ோ ൌ ݂൫ܪܪܫ ௝ǡ௧ିଵ
ோ Ǣܺ௝ǡ௧ିଵ൯
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The HHIR
j is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of concentration in market area j, with R= af-
filiate scheme, contributory or subsidized. This index reflects both the number of insurance 
providers in the market area and the distribution of market shares across insurers. The index is 
constructed by adding and weighting the squares of the market shares of all insurers within a 
market area.
An important methodological consideration when studying the effect of the concentration of 
health insurers on insurance coverage under their respective regimes is that this relationship 
cannot be estimated using the technique of ordinary least squares (OLS) due to the potential en-
dogeneity of the measure used to consider the market structure (HHI). First, the concentration 
of the EPS and coverage are correlated. The decision to enter or remain in a specific geographic 
market may be affected by the level of coverage in that area, as the insurers would tend to locate 
in less concentrated markets where there is the potential to compete, or in markets where there 
are potential competitors.
Another source of endogeneity for this measure concerns the simultaneity between the concen-
tration of insurers and the number of persons insured, where an increase in the concentration 
of insurance is a positive function of the number of members. Third, the HHI can be correlated 
with unobservable market characteristics that may influence the level of affiliation. As a result, 
the variable that controls for market structure, HHI, could be correlated with the error term and 
would be endogenous. It could also be correlated with unobservable characteristics that influ-
ence the demand for health insurance. This would lead to the selection of insurers by individuals 
in a nonrandom way (McLaughlin, 1987, McLaughlin et al., 1984). Thus the high costs associated 
with insurance may be the result of selection bias where high-risk individuals (the elderly, chil-
dren, pregnant women, un-healthy individuals, for example) are affiliated with the insurer.
To correct for the potential endogeneity of the concentration measure, the estimation method 
employed here is two-stage least squares (2SLS). The advantage of this method is that identifying 
the appropriate controls (instruments) to correct for endogeneity leads to unbiased estimators.
As the quality of the 2SLS estimate depends on the quality of the instruments used, we follow 
the recommendations of Murray and College (2010), the proposal of Staiger and Stock (1997) and 
the critical values of Stock and Yogo (2002) to detect weak instruments; moreover, we performed 
sub-identification and redundancy tests using Kleinbergen-Paap statistical tools.
Additionally, after determining the proper model for the analysis, we apply a robust Hausman 
test and the Sargan-Hansen test to determine whether fixed or random effects are the most ap-
propriate. The test result indicates that an analysis of the reduced form equation by 2SLS for 
panel data with a fixed effects model is more appropriate. 
The overall model is: 
Where: QR
jt is membership coverage in market area j (j= 1,..., 33) in period t (t= 2007, ..., 2011) 
under regime R (R= CR or SR ); Xjt is a vector of characteristics of the market area over time 
(control variables);  HHIR
jt  is a measure of market structure in a market area over time. The term 
vj is the effect of unobserved individual heterogeneity that does not change over time; T is a time 
Model I: ܳ௝௧
ோ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܪܪܫ ௝௧ିଵ
ோ ൅ ߚଶܺ௝௧ିଵ ൅ ߮௝ݒ௝ ൅ ߜ௧ܶ௧ ൅ ߳௝௧
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fixed effect, and ϵjt, is the usual error term including unobserved variables or effects that change 
over time. Following Dafny et al. (2011b), we include lags of the explanatory variables to reflect 
that insurers act prospectively by taking into account the premiums collected each period to 
define the level of insurance (Dafny et al., 2011b; Bates et al., 2010).
If there is an inverse relationship between the HHI indicator and Q, these behaviors suggest 
market power. That is, high market concentration will result in a restriction of the market prod-
uct, health insurance. Conversely, if there is a positive relationship between these two variables, 
this could be indicative of efficiency associated with larger firm size (Demsetz, 1973).
4.2.1 Defining market area
In the specific case of health services, for example, the two market dimensions are the product 
market and the geographic market. The first typically refers to the proximity to the patient and 
the second to the traditional socio-political division. For the analysis of insurance and health 
care, geographic proximity is most frequently employed; hence it tends to identify the geographic 
area around which some measure is defined. In the U.S., counties are treated as the geographical 
market of interest (Baker and Corts, 1996; Dranove et al., 2003 and Schneider et al., 2008). Other 
studies such as Kopit (2004) and Pauly et al. (2002), among others, employ the Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (or MSA) as the relevant geographic market.
The Colombian territory is divided in administrative and political provinces called departments, 
which are used to identify cultural and economic characteristics, governmental programs and 
budget definition. This study considers the department level as the geographic market, which 
was the most disaggregated level available in the data. As this is the first investigation of its kind 
in Colombia, there are no baseline studies that define market areas in a manner other than that 
proposed here. Future studies should verify whether the predictions obtained in this study per-
sist when considering, for example, metropolitan areas and cities.
4.2.2 Instrumental Variables
According to Evans et al. (1993), Bos (2004) and Bates et al. (2010), among others, a lagged index 
of market concentration represents a good instrument. Murray (2006), highlights the choice of 
the lag order: Some analysts use long lags of instruments, under the notion that higher-order lags 
can reduce the correlation between the instrument and the disturbance in an OLS regression; 
however, a longer lag length is more likely to be weakly correlated with the suspected endog-
enous variable.
Given this dilemma, HHI values with one and two-year lags are specified (and evaluated) as 
instruments in the various models. The prediction would be that larger market areas would lead 
to more insurers and lower concentration than smaller market areas (Pauly et al. 2002; Lamiraud 
& Frank, 2009). Thus, according to Pauly et al. (2002) market size and the number of physicians 
per 100,000 inhabitants are included (and evaluated) as potential instruments to predict market 
concentration.
As the quality of the 2SLS estimates depends on the quality of the instruments employed, we 
applied the rule of thumb proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) and the critical values in Stock 
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and Yogo (2002) to detect weak instruments. Additionally, we used the sub-identification and 
redundancy of instruments (statistical Kleinbergen-Paap) tests.
Some general statistical data are presented in Table 1.
Tab. 1 - Descriptive statistics for the average of the period 2007-2011. Source: National Depart-
ment of Statistics, DANE, Ministry of Social Protection and Solidarity and Guarantee Fund, 
Fosyga.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
HHI-CR 165 3231.9 1803.8
Coverage CR 165 58 25.82
HHI-SR 165 2752.9 1751.78
Coverage SR 165 90 28.72
Proportion of population with higher education (college) 165 25.83 14.00
Proportion of elderly people 165 12.39 3.06
GDP per-capita 165 3215.27 1879.27
Hospital Level I 165 2.44 1.52
Hospital Level II 165 0.66 0.58
Total population 165 1366429 1610369
Number of doctors 164 90.10 48.98
Proportion of children 165 21.81 3.83
Market penetration CR 165 3.206 0.691
Market penetration SR 165 4.067 0.303
Number of insurers CR 165 2.830 0.302
Number of insurers SR 165 2.048 0.542
Note: CR, contributive regime; SR, subsidized regime; HHI, Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index.
5. results
Before 1995, insurance coverage in Colombia was less than 10%; with the implementation of the 
social security reform, coverage increased to more than triple next year, which was considered 
a dramatic effect of the reform. However, even after more than fifteen years, the contributory 
scheme coverage does not exceed 60 %. That is even if membership is compulsory a part of the 
eligible population remains uninsured. What has been identified by the “Defensoría del Pueblo”, 
is that the insurance companies refuse membership on the grounds that the applicant for mem-
bership does not meet the income profile that guarantees payment of the premium (f.i., self-em-
ployed or micro-entrepreneur) and leaves no option to the citizen more than legal proceedings 
and claims; which, given the regulatory weakness of the Colombian health system and up being 
lengthy legal processes that discourage affiliation.
The average HHI for the period between 2007 and 2011 was 3,230 for the CR, with a minimum 
of 1,057 and a maximum of 8,144. The corresponding figures for the SR were an average of 2,753 
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with 943 and 8,758 being the minimum and maximum HHI values, respectively. This indicates 
that the markets under both regimes appear, on average, fairly concentrated when compared to 
the 1800 threshold proposed by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice. 
The figure 1 highlights the market areas where the HHI values are below that threshold. Ac-
cording to this indicator, for the entire period under the CR, 25% (8) of the market areas, on 
average, were not concentrated, while in 2007 and 2010, 27% and 30%, respectively, were not 
concentrated; in 2011, the percentage fell to 21%.
Fig. 1 - HHI Index by Market Area and Affiliation Regime. Source: Calculated by author with data from Min-
istry of Social Protection and Solidarity and Guarantee Fund, Fosyga.
Under the subsidized regime, the proportions are quite different but the trend is identical to 
that under the CR. On average, 40% of the market areas (13) did not exhibit high concentration 
[1049.46,1800.00]
(1800.00,6677.04]
Colombia: Contributive Regime, 2007
[1086.00,1800.00]
(1800.00,9026.20]
Colombia: Contributive Regime, 2011
[928.00,1800.00]
(1800.00,5538.91]
Colombia: Subsidized Regime, 2007
[937.00,1800.00]
(1800.00,10000.00]
Colombia: Subsidized Regime, 2011
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between 2007 and 2011. However, while 45% of the market areas were not concentrated in 2007, 
this percentage dropped to 36% in 2011. Comparatively, we observe a tendency toward more 
concentrated markets under the contributive regime than the subsidized regime, which is also 
reflected in the number of companies involved in each market.
The average number of insurance companies in the CR for the period considered in this study 
was 27 (with a minimum of 20 in 2011 and a high of 37 in 2009). The number of companies in 
this market has declined significantly, likely as a result of regulations on market entry and bank-
ruptcies that have occurred in recent years. The average number of insurance companies in the 
subsidized regime was nearly twice that in the CR, 46, and exhibited relatively high variability 
over the period (a minimum of 42 in 2011 and a maximum of 48 in 2008).
A less concentrated market profile for the Contributory Regime is primarily observed in large 
areas or those with relatively large populations. It is the case of Bogotá, Valle del Cauca and An-
tioquia (in ascending order of concentration), that in 2007, reached 39% of the country’s popula-
tion. However, market areas such as Caldas, Risaralda, Quindío and Tolima, which also had HHI 
values below 1800, had population sizes similar to those of Cauca, Cesar, Cordoba, Huila and 
Magdalena, where the markets were highly concentrated. Tolima, for example, which had 3.12% 
of the population in 2007, had a much lower concentration indicator than Cordoba, where had 
3.4% of the population, and Cundinamarca, which the corresponding value is 5.36%.
Throughout the period, the relatively more and less concentrated areas remain nearly constant. 
In 2011, the concentration map changes slightly, and markets such as Antioquia, Bolivar and 
Tolima are now among the most highly concentrated markets in the country. Even these market 
areas exhibit slight reductions in insurance coverage among the population compared to 2007 
and 2008.
The most concentrated market areas accounted for 68% of the country’s population in 2007, but 
these areas corresponded to 47% of the population in 2011. This is because important market 
areas such as Bogotá became concentrated in that year. Also noteworthy is that traditionally poor 
market areas, and therefore having more potential population for this regime, such as Chocó, 
Guainía, Guaviare, Putumayo and Vichada, remained among the more concentrated markets 
and, in some cases, doubled their concentration index values between 2007 and 2011.
This initial characterization verifies that the health insurance market is concentrated by market 
area, in both the CR and SR. Based on these concentration levels, we turn to an examination of 
the effect of market power on health insurance coverage. 
All variables are transformed into logarithms, and we used two-stage least squares (2SLS) with 
fixed effects and robust standard errors to correct for potential heteroskedasticity. Two models 
are estimated: one for the CR and one for the SR. The variable of interest in both models is the 
measure of concentration calculated by the HHI indicator.
In both models, we used as instruments to predict the concentration level: the HHI with two 
lags and market size lagged by one period (both in logs). The first stage regression verified that 
the instruments were significant at 95% (p-value <0.05) with respect to explaining the concen-
tration levels in the two markets, and in both cases the F-statistic exceeds the threshold of 10 
proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) for identifying weak instruments (F=39.54 for the CR, and 
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F=54.66 for the SR). Additionally, following Stock and Yogo (2005), we verified that the relative 
bias by 2SLS estimate is less than 10% of the bias by OLS estimates, and hence, the hypothesis 
of weak instruments is rejected.
The estimation results are presented in Table 2. Overall, they indicate that among the control 
variables, only the higher education coverage and first-level hospitals are significant in explain-
ing the level of coverage under the CR, while first and second-level hospitals are important 
under the SR. The per-capita income by market area, although not significant in explaining the 
membership in the CR (contrary to expectations), is positively related to the coverage level in this 
regime and negatively (and significantly) associated with membership in the subsidized regime. 
This verifies some degree of emphasis on targeting of insurance coverage of individuals unable 
to pay in the SR and those who are able to pay in the CR. These results are similar to those ob-
tained by Bates et al. (2010) in the case of private, individually purchased or employer-sponsored 
private insurance in the District of Columbia in the United States.
Tab. 2 - OLS and 2SLS estimates of affiliation and market concentration (second stage). Source: 
Calculated by author.
Dependent 
variable:
Log-Coverage_CR Log-Coverage_SR
OLS EE  2SLS EE  OLS EE  2SLS EE 
log HHI-CR -0.9286*** 0.0836 -0.966*** 0.126
log HHI-SR -0.003 0.04066 -0.045 0.053
log GDP 
per-capita
-0.021 0.074 0.077 0.070 -0.029 0.03742 -0.030 0.035
log propor-
tion of 
children
-0.549 0.429 -0.267 0.339 0.172 0.270 0.131 0.2515
log propor-
tion of old 
people
-0.589* 0.247 -0.574** 0.213 -0.036 0.158 -0.069 0.151
log Num. 
hospitals 
level I
0.226*** 0.059 0.260*** 0.042 -0.066 0.037 -0.075* 0.034
log Num. 
hospitals 
level II
0.104** 0.035 0.112** 0.034
log coverage 
college
0.197* 0.096 0.189* 0.090 -0.044 0.055 -0.047 0.055
constant 13.762*** 1.97 12.383*** 1.708 4.727*** 1.383 5.292*** 1.351
F-test of IV 39.54 54.66
n 159 159 159 159
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Note: 1). Statistical significance * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001. 2) Estimates for 33 market areas during 
the period 2007-2011. 3) Estimates include time fixed effects and geographic market area. 4) Robust Standard 
errors -EE- corrected for potential heteroskedasticity. 5) log HHI of CR and SR instrumented with two lags 
of the respective concentration indicator and one lag of population size of the market area. 6) The instruments 
for both models were evaluated for redundancy and sub-identification of the instruments (Kleibergen-Paap 
p-value= 0.000); weak identification test (Stock and Yogo, p-value= 0.000); and test by inference robust in case 
of weak identification (Anderson and Rubin, p-value= 0.000). From these we verified the importance of endo-
genous dependent variable and the identification of the instruments.
More relevant for the purposes of the present study is the analysis of the relationship between 
the HHI and coverage levels, indicating the exercise of market power or efficiencies associated 
with firm size. As shown in Table 2, the negative relationship is verified in both regimes, but it is 
significant only in CR. The estimated HHI coefficient in the membership model for CR, which 
represents the elasticity, suggests that a 10% increase in market concentration reduces insurance 
participation by 9.6%. The significance and magnitude of the elasticity is even more disturbing 
when you consider that these results use the Department as the relevant geographic market and 
thus the estimated effects are likely conservative.
The empirical evidence suggests that health insurers possess and exercise market power in the 
contributory insurance market. Specifically, the findings indicate that an increase in the HHI for 
the insurance market results in fewer individuals obtaining health insurance, especially in areas 
with the most vulnerable populations. An interesting subject for future research is to establish 
the mechanism by which insurers act to discourage membership. Specifically, as obtaining an 
insurance policy is mandatory, the values of the premium and benefit package are defined by 
law, and insurers are not allowed to exclude individuals on the basis of pre-existing conditions, 
insurers may employ mechanisms to dissuade or prevent individuals from obtaining insurance 
coverage (barriers to entry, out of pocket spending, etc.).
However in Colombia, an EPS may be denied membership if the applicant cannot demonstrate 
ability to pay. Recent assessments of the sector have shown that EPS avoid membership of 
certain groups such as the self-employed, because they consider it as a type of population with 
little stability in premium and high spending. For some insurers, the self-employed or small firm 
worker is a person who often only joins to take care for a specific high cost health event. While 
this phenomenon has not been documented in depth, some reports of the “Defensoría del Pue-
blo” show that the denial of membership by transfer from another insurer, to be independent 
worker and disenrollment of beneficiaries are some of the most common complaints from health 
system users.
6. dIscussIon and conclusIons
The study finds that the insurance markets for contributory regime is concentrated and insur-
ance companies exert market power in the health insurance market. This was demonstrated 
by the presence of an inverse relationship between the HHI concentration indicator and the 
number of insured individuals (insurance product coverage) by market area. Statistical evidence 
shows that the relationship between insurance market concentration and insurance coverage is 
not only negative, but is highly significant. This implies that even though the State tried to define 
the premium in order to ensure universal coverage, the results show that insurers are able to lev-
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erage their market power and the absence of effective regulation, to deny the membership to the 
population that is not attractive to the insurer. A legal intervention as the “Acción de Tutela” is 
being used by citizens to demand not only coverage services to people who are already members, 
but also the right to membership by non-members. But even the government is not clear whether 
the “Acción de Tutela” should be the tool to demand the right to membership. Part of the current 
reform debate that exists in the country, seeks to eliminate the enrollment process and ensure 
the right to provide services without going through an enrollment process for an insurer.
The health care reform established insurance as the strategy to ensure access; however the results 
of this research show that insurers have acted outlining their market. While regulations prohibit 
risk selection and insured exclusion, the trend in the market has shown that insurers have used 
their market power to affect the percentage of insured population as a way to keep a group of 
affiliated complying with maintaining financial stability of the insurer, in ensuring the regularity 
of premium. We can then forecast from this study that there is evidence that competition among 
insurers has played an important role in determining the terms of access for the population cov-
ered during the years 2007-2011. Given the particularities of health markets, social welfare issues 
must be decided from a second-best context, which implies that improvements in the health of a 
population depend on strong state regulation and intervention in these markets. Future research 
should focus on the development of measures that accurately capture product and firm charac-
teristics in the health insurance market. This approach can be used to track market changes such 
as increases in integration or the increased use of private insurance.
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